Fission bomb slow motion2/12/2024 Her research showed, however, that that was only part of the story of Richland and Ozersk. How did the operators keep these dangers secret from the public, and how did they keep their workers content and loyal when there was mounting evidence that these plants were dangerous to the health of all those that worked or lived near them? The traditional answer, according to Brown, is a tale of fortress-like cities and heavy security regimes. War-time pressure in 1944 called for this cooling period to be minimized, but the post-war arms race meant that the Soviet Maiak plant ran green fuel for many years and that in 1949 the Hanford plant ran a dangerous experiment with green fuel (called the “Green Run”) to see how they could trace the hot radioactive isotopes as they scattered across eastern Washington State. This fuel, pulled from the cooling ponds long before the recommended 90-day period, was called “green” and, when processed, would release vastly more radioactive iodine than fuel left to cool longer. One such shortcut was the length of time used uranium fuel was allowed to cool before being processed. The constant atmosphere of fear and pressure led each of the plants to taking dangerous short cuts to meet the mushrooming production goals. The rivalry fueled the growing arms race and ensured their continued existence and funding. The two plutonium plants and, by extension, their constituent populations “orbited each other and were produced in each other’s image.” Each time the project in one country was in danger of having its budget cut, the other would make some significant breakthrough, which would in turn spur production at the other. Rather, she illustrated the dangerous combination of misinformation, miscommunication, hopefulness, and, above all, pressure that contributed to many of the recurring mistakes made at each plant. They were, Brown contended, “intentional – part of the normal working order.” Brown did not, however, paint a picture of simple recrimination for the plant managers. The disasters at Hanford and Maiak, however, were catastrophes “in slow motion” and, more importantly, were not truly accidents. In answer to the first question, Brown observed that Chernobyl and Fukushima were disasters that “involved big meltdowns and occurred while the cameras were running.” That is, they were accidents that involved total failure of the plants and could not be hidden or covered up. Her research and the resulting book were born from two questions: why are the Hanford and Maiak plants (in Richland, USA and Ozersk, USSR, respectively) not household names like Chernobyl and Fukushima even though each plant issued “2 to 4 times more isotopes into the environment than Chernobyl?” And the corollary question, how did these plants, whose construction and operation involved hundreds of thousands of workers each, not create any significant whistleblowers until decades after their creation? “The production of nuclear weapons changed Soviet and American societies by creating whole new kinds of communities and new definitions of citizenship and safety and risk,” said Kate Brown at a presentation of her new book Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters. Careers, Fellowships, and Internships Open/Close.Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition. Science and Technology Innovation Program.Refugee and Forced Displacement Initiative.The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative.Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.
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